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Originally conceived and promulgated widely by development agencies, notably the World Bank, 
in response to concerns over the effectiveness of development assistance, the good governance 
agenda quickly gained concurrent currency within the broader framework of international 
economic law. In the realm of investment law, the language of good governance, its associated 
rule of law narrative and their relationship to development outcomes have been used to justify 
the normative and institutional evolution of law and policy in this area. Specifically, notions of 
stability, predictability and efficacy that feature prominently on the good governance and rule of 
law agenda have been widely conscripted to legitimise the rapid proliferation of international 
investment agreements (IIAs) and the attendant ascendency of the investment arbitration regime 
over the past two decades.  
 
More recently, as global criticism of and dissatisfaction with the current regime of investment 
law have intensified, the narratives of good governance and development have re-emerged as 
instruments of both critique and crisis containment of the legal framework for international 
investment. Reflecting the contested interpretative terrain that underpins these discourses, the 
concepts of good governance and the rule of law have alternately provided the language for 
challenging contemporary international investment law while supplying the scripts for a counter-
discourse that seeks to rehabilitate the normative and institutional credibility of the existing 
investment regime. Crucially, the discourse of good governance, framed in the context of 
development outcomes for host states, has once again been harnessed to justify the regulatory 
reforms of and limits placed on governmental action by international investment law.  
 
This paper examines the problematic revival of the good governance agenda and its relationship 
to international investment law and development. First, the paper reviews the origins of the good 
governance concept as a tool of development policy and practice, locating its inception and 
evolution within a particular policy and operational context. Second, the paper interrogates the 
agenda’s pivotal role in supplying the conceptual framework on which contemporary 
international investment law and policy is premised. In particular, the paper examines how the 
language of good governance has been instrumental in providing a justificatory link between 
international investment law and economic and social development in host states. The paper 
then proceeds to evaluate how the contemporary investment protection regime measures up to 
the same indicators of good governance subscribed to and promulgated by international 
development agencies.  
 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Rumana Islam for her research assistance and Ryan Ferro for his editorial work on this paper. 
I am also grateful to Koen de Feyter and Andrea Saldrriaga for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. All 
errors and omissions remain my own. 
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In doing so, the paper considers how the same discourse has alternately served as a potentially 
transformative narrative for confronting the negative dislocations of the investment framework 
at the same time as it is being utilised to diffuse systemic criticism and rehabilitate the credibility 
of the regime. Here, the paper cautions against the ahistorical import of the good governance 
agenda into the international investment law and policy unless accompanied by a broader 
systemic review and reform of the regime. It argues that while the discourse of good governance 
and development offers a useful prism for reflecting upon and/or challenging the substantive 
and procedural limitations of international investment law, the utility of these concepts must be 
placed within the broader context in which they were conceived and applied in law, policy and 
practice. 
 
2. Good Governance as a Development Construct 
 
a) Crisis Containment 
 
The genesis of the good governance agenda can be traced back to the conceptual shifts in 
development policymaking in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, driven by rapidly 
changing global economic and geo-political circumstances. Led by the World Bank, its key 
intellectual actor and financier, the emergence of the good governance project can be situated 
within a broader movement by the international development sector to recast the conceptual and 
operational premise of official development assistance in light of growing criticism that the 
development interventions of the postwar period were failing to deliver the outcomes envisioned 
by its architects, with developing countries remaining mired in a chronic poverty and debt trap. 
 
Specifically, international development practitioners were confronted with two distinct but 
interrelated challenges at the close of the 1980s. Firstly, the Washington Consensus model of 
economic organisation that informed the design of structural adjustment programmes over the 
past decade was failing to engender the expected economic growth and generating social and 
economic dislocations, including the exacerbation of income disparities and structural 
inequalities within and between states.2 Instead, the withdrawal or reduction of state support in 
key economic and social sectors, coupled with the removal of government controls over trade 
and financial flows, had ‘weakened the state as an institution’,3 removing not only its productive 
role in the economy but also much of its regulatory and administrative functions. Secondly and 
relatedly, concerns with weak governance of state agencies and fractured mechanisms for public 
accountability and democratic decision-making in aid recipient states had led to increasing public 
awareness in both donor and recipient states over the efficacy of development assistance. This, 
along with frustration with fragmented aid structures and processes, resulted in corresponding 
demands for greater transparency of and accountability for aid.4 
 
Influenced by the institutional turn in economics, rooted in the work of Robert Coase and 
popularised by Douglass North and, latterly, Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist at the World Bank 
at the time of this conceptual shift,5 good governance provided an expedient conceptual 
                                                 
2 Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (London and New York, 
Zed Books 2000) 37-38; SAPRIN, Structural Adjustment: The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality 
(London and New York, Zed Books 2004) 1-4.  
3 SAPRIN (n 2) 76. 
4 Martin Doombos, ‘‘Good Governance’: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?’ (2001) 37(6) The Journal of 
Development Studies 93, 97-102; Stephen Humphreys, Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in 
Theory and Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) 133-135; Carlos Santiso, ‘Development Finance, 
Governance and Conditionality: Politics Matter’ (2004) 7(1) International Public Management Journal 73, 75-76. 
5 Toby Carroll, Delusions of Development: The World Bank and the Post-Washington Consensus in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke 
and New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 70-82; Tor Krever, ‘The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory; The 
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framework for addressing these latent concerns of the development practitioners while 
maintaining the credibility of past and future aid programmes. Emerging from and refined by a 
series of reports from the World Bank,6 the good governance agenda reconceptualises the 
relationship between the state and the market, viewing the state as central to the promotion of 
economic development, not as a primary provider of goods and services but rather as ‘a partner, 
catalyst and facilitator’ of market.7   
 
The central message of the good governance agenda was and continues to be that structural and 
macroeconomic reforms are insufficient to generate economic growth and social development 
outcomes without an enabling institutional environment to underpin them. According to this 
approach, success of economic reform programmes and efficacy of development interventions 
are dependent on the effectiveness of institutions – including the civil service, judicial systems, 
financial regulators and supervisory authorities, legislatures, and civil society groups8 – to support 
them. Good governance, it was argued, entailed not only ‘effective participation in public policy-
making’ but also ‘the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary’ and 
‘institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, and 
effective oversight agencies’.9 
 
For its proponents, the good governance agenda served as a credible foil to critics of mainstream 
development policy and practice at the time, supplying both a conceptual framework to explain 
the substantive failures of development assistance while providing a technocratic arsenal for 
tackling the more instrumentalist concerns of aid delivery and effectiveness. The failures of 
earlier development interventions were therefore less to do with the  content of the economic 
prescriptions themselves than with how these reforms are implemented by recipient 
governments and whether these governments possess the necessary institutional framework to 
successfully embed such in pursuit of social and economic objectives. At its core, the good 
governance agenda seeks at once to both problematise and reinvigorate the role of the state in 
economic development and social welfare. It recognises the importance of public institutions in 
the economy but at the same time places the burden of institutional development and 
effectiveness on the state while legitimising the interventions of the international development 
community where such institutional failures are perceived of as inadequate.10  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development Model’ (2011) 52(1) Harvard International Law Journal 287, 302-
304. 
6 The concept of good governance was first mooted in a World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa that 
characterised the crisis in Africa as ‘a crisis of governance’ and elaborated and expanded in subsequent documents, 
most notably in its landmark report on Governance and Development in 1992 (Washington DC, World Bank 1992), the 
Bank’s governance and anti-corruption strategy, Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance (World Bank, 
Washington DC, World Bank 2000) and successive editions of its annual flagship World Development Reports (WDR), 
including that of 1997 on The State in a Changing World (New York, Washington DC, World Bank and Oxford 
University Press 1997), Building Institutions for Markets in 2002 (Washington DC, New York, World Bank and Oxford 
University Press 2002) and A Better Investment Climate for Everyone in 2005 (Washington DC, World Bank 2005). For a 
historical review of the Bank’s conceptual thinking, see Krever (n 5); Carlos Santiso, ‘Good Governance and Aid 
Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality’ (2001) 7(1) The Georgetown Public Policy Review 1; Santiso, 
‘Development Finance, Governance and Conditionality’ (n 4).  
7 World Bank WDR 1997, (n 6); also Carroll (n 5) 2-3; David Craig and Doug Porter, Development Beyond 
Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy, (Abingdon, Routledge 2006) 10-15; David Trubek, 
‘The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of a New Developmental State’ (2009) 1(1) Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law 28, 31.  
8 World Bank, WDR 2002 (n 6) 2, table 1; World Bank, WDR 1997 (n 6) 7 - 11.   
9 Santiso, ‘Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness’ (n 6) 5. 
10 Abrahamsen (n 2) 41 – 45; Carroll (n 5) 76 – 78; Santiso, ‘Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness’ (n 6) 5. 
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b) Disciplining the New Developmental State11 
 
A central plank in the good governance agenda is the concept of the rule of law, an instrument 
through which state power can be curtailed, diffused, and channelled towards creating the 
environment for economic growth and social development. The rule of law provides a 
mechanism through which the aforementioned invigorated role of the state in the economy can 
be managed and delimited. With its emphasis on developing functional judicial, legislative, 
administrative and regulatory regimes within developing countries, the rule of law supplies ‘the 
normative and institutional structure’12 to support the construction of a market economy. It does 
so through the promotion of legal systems which are entrusted ‘with the task of protecting 
individual rights’, notably property and contractual rights, by constraining the inclination of 
political power to expand, to act arbitrarily and to abuse its prerogatives’.13 An effective rule of 
law is therefore seen as a requirement of this new regulatory developmental state, a bulwark 
against the exercise of arbitrary state power and excessive state intervention in the economy and 
a guarantor and an enforcer of private contracts and property transactions.14  
 
This emphasis on institutions and the rule of law makes good governance an attractive 
conceptual paradigm for embedding the law and policy of a nascent international investment 
regime predicated on liberalisation and investor protection. Indeed, an important component of 
the governance approach to development policy has been the creation of a so-called enabling 
climate for foreign investment in developing countries and transition economies as a means of 
incentivising foreign direct investment (FDI) in efforts to deliver developmental outcomes. 
Efforts to foster this investor-friendly environment in developing countries have ranged from 
embedding legal and regulatory reform of economic sectors in broader developmental policy 
loans from the international financial institutions to discrete judicial reform and legal training 
projects funded through multilateral loans and bilateral donor grants.15 The World Bank Group, 
in particular, has been at the forefront of advocating this ‘investment climate approach’ to 
development, arguing that countries’ transition towards market economies cannot be achieved 
with legal and institutional reform and ‘firmly establishing the rule of law to create the necessary 
climate of stability and predictability’.16 
 
The emergence of an international legal framework of investment protection in the past two 
decades builds on the reforms promoted through international development interventions. 
Consisting of a proliferating network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment 
chapters of free trade agreements and an increasingly sophisticated international arbitral system, 
this regime constitutes a major ‘paradigm shift’ in international investment law.17 Unlike the 
previous, ad-hoc landscape of investment protection predicated on customary legal principles and 
                                                 
11 This term is adopted from Trubek’s conception of the new functions of the state in contemporary international 
political economy that is qualitatively different from the classical notion of a developmental state (Trubek (n 7) 31). 
In the former, the state assumes a productive role in the economy while the latter conception views the state as a 
driver for and regulator of private sector activity (ibid).  
12  Pietro Costra and Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (The Netherlands, Springer 2007) 19. 
13 ibid. 
14 Humphreys (n 4) 138-140; Krever (n 5); World Bank, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform (2004 Edn, Washington 
DC, World Bank 2004) 2. 
15 International Finance Corporation, International Finance Institutions and Development through the Private Sector: A Joint 
Report of 31 Multilateral and Bilateral Development Finance Institutions (Washington DC, International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 2011) 33 – 34; World Bank, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform (n 14) 3 – 4.  
16 World Bank, Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform (n 14) 2.  
17 Stephan W Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ (2011) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 57, 74 – 75. 
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espousal of claims through home states, contemporary international investment law is much 
more codified, juridified and, some would argue, depoliticised.18 
 
Proponents of this new universe of IIAs and arbitral tribunals argue that it provides a stable and 
predictable regime of investment governance that is crucial because of the evolving nature of 
‘political risk’, especially in emerging markets and developing economies. The rapid liberalisation 
of cross-border capital flows and the mass privatisations of key economic sectors, such as 
extractive industries and utilities, in developing countries since the mid-1980s shifted the 
landscape of foreign direct investment significantly. Specifically, the aforementioned changing 
role of the state from a producer of goods and services to a regulator of a multiplicity of private 
actors charged with the ownership and operation of economic sectors had led to new concerns 
over the exercise of state power vis-à-vis foreign investors. In a complex domestic landscape 
which posits the state as an interlocutor between a myriad of local and foreign private actors 
within an intricate web of transnational and national commercial arrangements, new political 
risks are argued to arise not from the actions of the government itself but how it balances the 
relationships between different domestic and foreign constituents. 
 
In other words, risk to investors today is perceived not as stemming primarily from overt 
interference of states with the proprietary rights of the investor, such as through forced 
nationalisations of entities or industries, or from the impact of civil insecurity and failure to 
maintain law and order. Instead, political risk is said to arise from broader use of state regulatory 
power and the institutional framework – or lack thereof – under which governmental authority is 
exercised.19 This is compounded by the increasing devolution of regulation, including to quasi-
governmental and private agencies, and political decentralisation to sub-national entities that 
further destabilises the domestic framework in which foreign investment takes place. At the 
same time, the transactional complexities of contemporary investments – that can include 
multilevel and multinational firm contracting – demands greater institutional and legal stability 
for enforcement of agreements between private entities to reduce the so-called transactional 
costs of doing business.20   
 
The good governance agenda therefore provides a legitimising discourse for the new structure of 
international investment law, providing a frame of reference through which the discipline of 
governmental action vis-a-vis the private sector can be justified. The logic of this confluence 
between development policy and investment rules maintains that good governance is key to 
                                                 
18 See Jose E Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (The Hague, The Hague 
Academy of International Law 2011) 59; Ibrahim F I Shihata, ‘Toward a Greater Depoliticization of Investment 
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA’ in Kevin W Lu, Gero Verheyen and Srilal M Perera (eds), Investing with 
Confidence: Understanding Political Risk Management in the 21st Century (Washington DC, Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency 2009). The depoliticisation aspect refers to the right of foreign investors under investment 
treaties to bring claims directly against host states in an ostensibly neutral international forum, thereby extricating 
host states from involvement in such disputes as was the case under the system of state espousal of claims (Jose E 
Alvarez, above, 99; Susan D Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of 
Law’ (2007) 19 Global Business & Development Law Journal 337, 343 - 344; Ibrahim F I Shihata, above, 4 – 6).  
19 See Patrick Garver, ‘The Changing Face of Political Risk’, in Kevin W. Lu, Gero Verheyen and Srilal M. Perera 
(eds), Investing with Confidence: Understanding Political Risk Management in the 21st Century (Washington DC, World Bank 
Group 2009); Thomas Waelde, ‘The Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines, Rules and Treaties in Reducing 
the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment in Developing Countries’ (A Conceptual 
Study in Preparation for the World Bank Conference on Political and Regulatory Risks in Private Infrastructure 
Investment, 9 – 10 September, Rome, Italy 1999) <www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/jorunal/html /vol5/article 5-
5.html> accessed 10 January 2014. 
20 Garver (n 19) 82 – 83; Thomas Waelde, ‘Changing Directions for International Investment Law in the Global 
Economy’ (1998) CEPMLP On-line Journal on Natural Resources, Energy and International Business Transactions 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp /main/html/journal/vol1-5.htm> accessed 10 January 2014, 31. 
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attracting foreign investment which in turn translates into economic growth and resources for 
social development.21 Here, the problematisation of host state legal and governance regimes as 
weak and inadequate for the purposes of global economic integration legitimises the 
interventions of the international community by way of the aforementioned good governance 
and rule of law projects and latterly by way of legal reform induced by IIAs. 
 
3. Investment Law as Good Governance 
 
a) Externalisation of Investment Governance 
 
The structure of contemporary international investment law externalises the internal governance 
of foreign investment by subjecting the exercise of state power in respect to investment policy 
and practice to a higher source of law. It requires the exercise of government authority in this 
area to be made within an externally supervised framework of correspondingly externally derived 
rules and principles.22 The existence of this external body of law governing states’ relationships 
with foreign investors coupled with a system of dispute resolution that automatically elevates 
settlement of state-investor disputes to an international forum therefore constrains state power 
more effectively than patchy and ad-hoc institutional changes implemented through reforms 
promoted by international development agencies.  
 
IIAs ‘lock in’ institutional and regulatory changes by making it difficult for states to renege on 
their commitments to liberalise investment regimes and to establish principles for the treatment 
of foreign investors that is not dependent on domestic laws or administrative decision-making. 
Host state regulatory prerogatives are constrained by these agreements through substantive treaty 
guarantees – including assurances against expropriation without compensation, the fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) of investors by the host state and guarantees of full protection and 
security – supported by the right to enforce them outside the host state’s legal system through 
international arbitral tribunals.23 This right of investors to pursue claims directly against host 
states in an international forum is a landmark in international law, constituting the broadest 
expansion of legal personality of private actors in the postwar period. The distinctiveness of this 
contemporary universe of IIAs is that ‘they are designed to function without the political 
involvement of either host-or home governments’, enabling, in the majority of cases, foreign 
investors to file claims against host states before international arbitral tribunals without 
‘exhausting local remedies at host states’ courts, and without authorisation from or endorsement 
by their own home states’.24 
 
The reference to an external source of law and enforcement of obligations by an international 
dispute settlement body conforms ostensibly with the standards of good governance and the rule 
of law, notably with regard to state action. It situates the exercise of governmental authority 
                                                 
21 See Rudolph Dolzer, ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law’ (2005) 
37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 953, 953 – 954; Franck, ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (n 18) 341; Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy’ (n 17) 62. 
22 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT 
Generation (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2012) 1 – 2; 146 – 147; W Michael Reisman and Robert D Sloane, ‘Indirect 
Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation’ (2004) 75(1) British Yearbook of International Law 115, 116 
– 117. 
23 Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (n 18) 342; Montt (n 22) 127.  
24 Montt (n 22) 1 – 2. This can be contrasted with the so-called ‘denial of justice’ system under the previous era of 
investment disputes premised on the customary international legal principle of state responsibility for the 
mistreatment of aliens (Montt (n 22) 17 – 19). Here, the diplomatic protection of home states could only be sought 
by a foreign investor in a claim against the host state ‘once domestic courts [in host states] had acted on the case 
under dispute’ and were found wanting in this regard (ibid).  
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within a framework of clearly recognisable rules and principles and enables the scrutiny of a 
state’s administrative and legislative acts by an independent tribunal based on its interpretation of 
these rules and principles.25 IIAs purportedly resolve what Yackee terms ‘the central problematique 
of host state-foreign investor relations’: that of the ‘obsolescing bargain’ where ‘the host state 
will opportunistically interfere with the investment’s profitability once the investment has been 
sunk’.26 These agreements also overcome the so-called ‘dynamic inconsistency problem’ for host 
states, enabling states to commit to an investment project without fear that a future government 
will interfere with the rights guaranteed to the investor.27 
 
The current international investment architecture therefore said to promote investment certainty 
protecting foreign investors against the risk of reliance on a) potentially mutable domestic laws 
of host states governing their investments; and b) potentially partial, politically motivated or 
incompetent local courts to adjudicate on disputes arising from such investments.28 Additionally, 
the privity of an arbitration process designed for commercial disputes also generally restricts the 
involvement of third parties and excludes considerations of broader social and economic policy 
issues outside the subject matter of the dispute (a subject to which we return in section 5). In the 
eyes of foreign investors, this guards against political opportunism and regulatory interference 
with investor rights induced by claims from interest groups in host states.29 
 
Accordingly, accession to IIAs is often viewed as a corollary development to ‘good governance’ 
and ‘investment climate’ reforms, with entry into such agreements regarded as an indicator of a 
host state’s commitment to enabling a hospitable legal environment for foreign investment. IIA 
advocates argue that such a commitment by a host state encourages inward investment by 
signalling ‘receptivity to foreign investments’ or enhancing the state’s credibility as a reputable 
international actor’.30 Thus, it has been argued IIAs often serve as substitutes for ‘domestic 
institutional quality’,31 providing a mechanism for the protection of investor rights where such 
domestic guarantees are weak.32 
 
b) Incentivising Domestic Institutions  
 
The importance of IIAs as an indicator of investment governance has led to arguments that the 
contemporary investment regime incentivises domestic governance reforms. States with weak 
institutional capacity are compelled to develop ‘an effective normative framework’ for 
governance that includes, inter alia, ‘impartial courts, an efficient and legally restrained 
                                                 
25 Montt (n 22) 147; UNCTAD, ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries’ (UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 
New York and Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2009) 14 – 15.  
26 Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment and the Rule of (International) Law: 
Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?’ (2008) 42(4) Law and Society Review 805, 807.  
27 Tom Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance’ (2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 107, 113. 
28 Ronald Daniels, ‘Defecting on Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Subversion of the Law of Law 
in the J Developing World’ (Toronto, University of Toronto, Draft dated 23 March 2004 
<www.unisi.it/lawandeconomics/stile2004/daniels.pdf> accessed 10 January 2014 22 – 23.  
29 UNCTAD, ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements’ (n 29) 14 – 15; Thomas Waelde, ‘The 
Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines, Rules and Treaties’ (n 19) 28 – 29.  
30 Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (n 18) 341, drawing on Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘When 
BITs Have Some Bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties’ (2011) 6(1) Review of 
International Organizations 1; Andrew Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 639 and Kenneth J 
Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2000) 41(2) Harvard International Law Journal 469. 
31 Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries?’ (2005) 33(10) World Development 1567, 1578.  
32 ibid; Ginsburg (n 27) 14. 
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bureaucracy, and the measure of transparency in decision[making] that has increasingly been 
recognized as a control mechanism over governments’.33 Recent studies have indicated that IIAs 
can attract FDI to developing countries but only as a complement rather than a substitute to a 
hospitable institutional environment.34 In other words, while international investment 
agreements can lend credibility to countries with a qualitatively adequate institutional framework, 
‘they cannot bootstrap a high risk country’ to the same level as countries with more robust 
institutions for investor protection.35   
 
This impetus to improve domestic institutional quality is driven primarily by the financial threat 
of non-compliance with IIAs. Host state signatories to IIAs risk incurring significant costs if they 
do not reform domestic institutions to give effect to treaty standards of protection, including 
direct costs of litigation for treaty breaches and any ensuing compensatory damages to the 
foreign investor as well as indirect costs, such as the aforementioned effects of reputational 
loss.36 Given the broad and open-ended nature of most IIA provisions, this commitment to 
governance reform is significant, involving not only the liberalisation of economic sectors under 
the non-discrimination obligations but also changes in domestic law, administrative and 
regulatory policy and practice to conform with state’s obligations under the FET and 
transparency principles and compliance with standards of expropriation and compensation.   
 
Governance reforms induced by IIAs have been posited, in some circles, as welcome incentives 
to shift government behaviours for the betterment of their domestic constituents, conferring 
upon international investment law a broader function of enabling social and political 
development. These changes occur on several registers. First, it has been argued that the 
liberalisation of a host state’s investment regime can result in greater competition in economic 
sectors, breaking up existing monopolies and oligopolies and entrenched political interests in 
previously closed door economies. These structural reforms, viewed in corollary to the 
aforementioned ‘investment climate approach’ promulgated by development agencies and 
donors, are mapped as part of a broader virtuous circle of free markets and the rule of law. Here, 
an international commitment to liberalisation can be perceived as ‘a domestic defense 
mechanism to insulate the state from local rent-seeking efforts’ and spurring competition among 
domestic as well as foreign investors.37  
 
Second, liberalisation reforms of IIAs are buttressed by substantive and procedural investor 
protection provisions and their increasingly expansive interpretation by arbitral tribunals. 
Expressions of good governance and the rule of law have featured prominently in tribunal 
interpretations of substantive treaty standards, notably in considerations of the FET and 
transparency principles. Specifically, interpretations of the former standard, regarded as the 
‘alpha and the omega’ of the so-called ‘BIT generation’,38 have clustered around a core of 
‘normative principles’ identified by Kingsbury and Schill forming the contours of what 
                                                 
33 Reisman and Sloane (n 22) 117. 
34 For example, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman’s latest study on BITs and inward investment found that ‘the marginal 
benefit of entering into a BIT is higher for a developing country with a better institutional quality ranking’, less of on 
an impact ‘in the riskiest environments’ and ‘a larger positive effect for countries with moderate levels of political 
risk’ (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (n 30) 6); See also Yackee (n 26).  
35 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (n 30) 6.  
36 See Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on 
Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011) 65(3) International Organisation 401; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (n 30); Yackee 
(n 30). 
37 Ginsburg, (n 27) 119; Alvarez (n 18) 378.  
38 Montt (n 22) 294. 
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constitutes ‘good administrative governance’ in host states.39 These include requirements of 
‘stability predictability and consistency’ of the host state’s legal framework;40 ‘protection of 
legitimate expectations’;41 ‘administrative due process and prohibition of denial of justice’42 and 
the ‘requirement of transparency’.43 
 
The use of the language of good governance to justify this expansive reach of international 
investment law into the domestic sovereign realm has been justified and indeed promoted by its 
proponents who argue that such ‘normative seepage’44 can influence the positive development of 
legal, regulatory and administrative institutions in host states. For example, it has been argued 
that requirements for transparency in and accountability for regulatory change and administrative 
decision-making may in turn combat political corruption and temper arbitrary or discretionary 
exercises of state power.45 Meanwhile, it is argued that regulatory competition between domestic 
courts and international arbitral mechanisms can incentivise local courts to ‘compete for the 
business of resolving commercial disputes and therefore improve their quality’.46  
 
In other words, it has been contended that institutional reforms induced by IIAs to protect 
foreign investors can ‘trickle down’ to host state constituents generally, including domestic 
investors as well as other stakeholders. Competition with or mimicry of external legal or 
regulatory regimes can, in some instances, strengthen weak internal governance and force 
governments to confront weak administrative and legal institutions. It can, in some 
circumstances, embed a culture of transparency and accountability that may lead not only to 
economic growth but also broader social development and political franchise. In these contexts, 
the language of good governance is used here to leverage transformations in the legal, regulatory 
and political institutions of host state developing countries similar to the way in which the 
concept is expressed in development policy and practice discussed in section 2 to justify the 
governance reforms promulgated by development agencies and donors.  
  
4. Taking Governance to Task 
 
a) Enclaves and Exclusions 
 
The progressive expansion of the scope of protection offered under BITs and other IIAs by 
arbitral tribunals has meant that there are few aspects of host state regulatory authority that are 
not covered by their treaty obligations and potentially subject to review by international 
arbitrators, raising significant concerns about the negative correlation between investment law 
and domestic governance mechanisms. The positive correlation between international 
investment law and institutional development and the rule of law in host states is tenuous despite 
the arguments forwarded by proponents of IIAs discussed in section 3. Instead, there is 
                                                 
39 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law (IILJ Working Paper 2009/6, New York University School of 
Law 2009) 8 – 10. 
40 CMS Gas Transmission v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005); Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (August 30, 2000).   
41 Technicas Medioambientales TecMed, S.A. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003); International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Arbitration Proceedings (January 26, 2006). 
42 Metalclad v Mexico (n 44). 
43 ibid; Technicas Medioambientales TecMed, S.A. v Mexico (n 41). See Kingsbury and Schill (n 43) 8 – 15.   
44 ibid 16.  
45 Kingsbury and Schill (n 39) 16- 17; Juanita Olaya, Good Governance and International Investment Law: The Challenges of 
Lack of Transparency and Corruption (Second Biennial Global Conference July 8-10 2010, The University of Barcelona,  
Society of International Economic Law 2010) 3 – 5. 
46 Ginsburg (n 27), 119. 
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mounting evidence to suggest that the constraints levelled on states by IIAs and the elevation of 
investor-state disputes to an international arbitral system premised on adjudicating upon 
primarily commercial matters is having a negative effect on good governance and the rule of law 
in host states.  
 
First, there is criticism that an international regime for investment protection that relies primarily 
on an external authority for the source of rules and principles and on an extra-territorial means 
of dispute settlement does not provide sufficient motivation for endogenous local development. 
According to Ginsburg, this ‘decision to bypass domestic courts may reduce courts’ incentives to 
improve performance by depriving key actors from a need to invest in institutional 
improvement’.47 Unlike the governance and rule of law interventions of the international 
development community (see section 2), states are expected to independently manage the 
process of regulatory and institutional compliance with IIA provisions. Without financial support 
or technical expertise, coupled with limited institutional and professional capacity in many 
developing countries, host states will struggle with improving judicial quality to the standards 
expected by foreign investors who, given an option, would prefer international arbitration over 
domestic remedies. 
 
The removal of local courts and laws from the jurisdiction of foreign investment claims results in 
the creation of ‘legal enclaves’48 which enable foreign investors to exit domestic jurisdictions and 
rely on an external legal regime for protection of their rights and adjudication of their disputes 
with host states.49 This ‘siphoning off’ of foreign investor-host state conflict to another 
jurisdiction for contest can undermine the function of the local judiciary and legal system.50 
Inasmuch as commitment to IIAs and international arbitration can signal host state credibility in 
the treatment of foreign investors within its domestic legal and administrative environment, 
these same commitments can also signal the host state’s own loss of confidence in the same 
institutions to do the same. 
 
The practice of ‘allowing foreign investors to leap-frog over domestic courts’ has major 
ramifications on standards of good governance within host states.51  The provision of a right to 
international arbitration as the first recourse under most IIAs supplant the public rationales 
which still underpin the time-honoured local remedies rule – still applied by most international 
and regional dispute settlement bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) – and promulgate a near universal distrust of local legal 
regimes, irrespective of their reliability.52 The limitation or removal of the local remedies rule in 
IIAs presume that local courts are incapable of delivering justice and deny domestic institutions 
the opportunity to review and, if necessary, redress the substance of the claims against the host 
government.53 
 
The limited role of local courts in investment disputes, effectively rendering them little more 
than enforcers of external arbitral decisions, has an impact on public confidence in the domestic 
                                                 
47 ibid.  
48 Daniels (n 28).  
49 ibid; Ginsburg (n 27).  
50 ibid. 
51 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Evaluating Canada’s 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement in Light of Civil 
Society Concerns’ (CCIC June 2006) < http://www.ccic.ca/ _files/en /what_we_do/trade_2006-06_foreign_ 
investment_memo_e.pdf> accessed 9 January 2014, 1 – 2. 
52 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2006) 17(1) European Journal of International Law 121, 130.  
53 ibid; see also Alvarez (n 18) 68 – 69.  
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legal system. This is particularly striking when courts have little option but to give effect to an 
award which may have negative ramifications on public interests with little opportunity to review 
the merits of the award. Enabling foreign investors to bypass local legal systems can also prevent 
the endogenous evolution of law through judicial precedent and statutory interpretation. This is 
particularly relevant in common law systems where such judicial activism is central to the 
development of law and which rely on test and novel cases to further the development of 
specific arenas of law and policy. 
 
Crucially, the relocation of foreign investment disputes away from local courts and the subjection 
of these disputes to external law remove incentives for foreign investors to participate as civic 
actors within home states, enabling the withdrawal of their voice from domestic debates on legal 
and judicial reform and regulatory change. This system can create a two-tiered regime of 
investment governance in which foreign and domestic investors are subjected to different 
systems of rules and adjudication and allow a government ‘to segment its reputation among 
domestic and foreign actors’.54 This can lead to asymmetries in the treatment of foreign and local 
investors with foreign investors benefitting from a highly specialised, institutionalised and often 
more efficient mechanism for adjudication while consigning domestic investors to often 
overburdened local courts.55 
 
b) Regulatory Chill and the Social Contract 
 
The governance concerns stemming from reliance on external institutions for adjudication is 
compounded by the significant shortcomings of the arbitral system to which a rapidly rising 
number of investment disputes are referred.56 These concerns, which are well-documented, fall 
broadly into two categories: a) criticism of the expansionist scale of tribunal decisions and their 
impact on host states and their local constituents; and b) critique of the procedural deficiencies 
of the process of international arbitration. Underlying these concerns is what Schill terms the 
‘public law challenge’57 of a system that is public in character but private in form, charged with 
the review of inherently public and civic issues but operationally and conceptually premised on a 
framework that was designed for commercial disputes between private actors. The open-ended 
nature of substantive content of investment agreements coupled with the overarching raison d’etat 
of investment treaties to minimise political and regulatory risk has meant that the arbitral system 
has been called upon to adjudicate matters of public concern in host states without the 
corresponding institutional framework or professional expertise to support it.  
 
Acting under the auspices of BITS and other IIAs, arbitral tribunals have been called upon to 
evaluate claims relating to a wide range of governmental action ranging from termination of 
                                                 
54 Ginsburg (n 27) 119.  
55 In Glamis Gold v USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Arbitration Proceedings, Award (June 8, 2009), for example, the 
foreign mining company sought to challenge Californian mining regulations under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)’s Chapter 11 provision for arbitration rather than in a Californian Court (see Brynn Olsen, 
‘International Local Government Law: The Effect of NAFTA Chapter 11 on Local Land Use Planning’ (2007) 4 
International Law and Management Review 53). 
56 The number of known investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases has risen exponentially since the mid-1990s. 
In 2012, there were at least 58 new cases filed, constituting the ‘highest number of known treaty-based disputes ever 
filed in one year’, the majority of which were filed against developing countries and economies in transition 
(UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Updated for the Multilateral 
Dialogue on Investment, 28-29 May 2013’ (IIA Issue Note 1, United Nations Conference on Trade and  
Development (UNCTAD) 2013) 1. At the end of 2011, there were a total of 514 known treaty-based investment 
cases (ibid 3).  
57 Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy’ (n 17) 67. 
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water concession contracts58 to government failure to renew a licence for the operation of a 
landfill59 and refusal of a permit to operate a hazardous waste disposal facility60 to the institution 
of environmental and cultural impact assessments61 and government bans on gasoline additives.62 
In a series of cases resulting from the Argentinean financial crisis in 2000 – 01, arbitral tribunals 
have had to examine the legitimacy of government acts to redenominate the local currency in the 
midst of economic exigencies.63  
 
In many of these cases, tribunals have been called upon to assess the quality of governance in 
host states by evaluating not only the appropriate scope of governmental action but also the 
efficacy of state institutions when carrying out the functions of government.64 Frequently called 
upon to ‘resolve wider conflicts of rights and interests between international investors, on the 
one hand, and individuals who benefit from domestic regulation of business on the other’,65 
arbitral tribunals are regularly entertaining ‘claims that would otherwise lie with the exclusive 
province of constitutional and supreme courts in host states’.66 Under municipal law, this review 
of governmental action is normally conducted by the public judicial system, usually honouring 
the constitutional separation of powers that enables citizenry rights to be guaranteed by judicial 
review of executive or legislative action. Removing the forum for review to an external system 
has significant ramifications not only for the conduct of government in host state but also the 
relationship between state and its constituents. 
 
A key concern arising from the deficiencies of the investment arbitral system is that the stability 
and predictability afforded by the legal protections under international investment law for 
foreign investors has translated into a corresponding instability and lack of predictability for host 
states and their domestic constituents. Governments may now be reluctant to institute regulatory 
or administrative changes even where such reforms are necessary for the protection of public 
interest. In seeking to manage ‘political risk’ and ‘regulatory opportunism’ by host states (see 
section 2), international investment law conversely exerts a ‘regulatory chill’ on host governments 
through substantive treaty provisions and stabilisation clauses in investment contracts that seek 
to freeze regulations in host states, including changes necessitated by shifting economic and 
environmental circumstances.67 
 
                                                 
58 See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (July 24, 2008). 
59 See Technicas Medioambientales TecMed, S.A. v Mexico (n 41). 
60 See Metalclad Corporation v Mexico (n 40). 
61 See Glamis Gold v USA (n 55). 
62 See Methanex Corporation v United States of America UNCITRAL (NAFTA) Arbitration Proceedings (August 3, 
2005). 
63 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (n 40); Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, 
L.P. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007); Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16 (September 28, 2007).  
64 As Dolzer observes, ‘[t]he appropriate time for filing an appeal, the process of determining a relevant fact, and the 
judicial administration of justice in general have all been subject to review by this growing jurisprudence’ (Dolzer (n 
21) 970). 
65 Gus Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the International System of 
Investor Protection’ (2005) 12(4) Review of International Political Economy 600, 615.  
66 Montt (n 22) 126. 
67 Metalclad Corporation v Mexico (n 40); CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (n 40); Enron Creditors 
Recovery Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); 
Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic (n 63); LG& E Energy Capital Corp. and LG& E International Inc. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1) (July 25, 2007). 
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This creates what Schneiderman describes as a ‘political economy of certainty’ which insulates 
‘key aspects of economic life from the pressures of majoritarian politics’.68 In many host states, 
the decision of the executive to enter into IIAs has been taken without adequate consultation 
with local communities and other domestic constituents, including local businesses that may be 
affected by the substantive terms of such treaties. Despite the wide-ranging scope of IIAs and 
their significant impact on the capacity of host states to act in the public interest, host states have 
routinely entered into these agreements without satisfactory consultation and debate.69 In some 
countries where entry into an international agreement remains the prerogative of the executive, 
the waiver of government authority in this manner has raised significant questions over the 
exercise state power. 
 
Additionally, the shift from domestic lawmaking and adjudication mechanisms to a process that 
enshrines in private adjudicators ‘the authority to review the legitimacy of state action and 
omissions according to undefined standards of review’70 exerts a constitutional toll on the social 
compact between the host state and its citizens. Aside from the privileging of foreign investors 
discussed in section 3, the extensive constraints placed on state’s regulatory prerogatives by IIAs 
and arbitral jurisprudence can undermine the institution of the state itself, calling into question 
the very function of government and government institutions. This is particularly acute in host 
states with fragile political coalitions, those emerging from economic crisis, natural disasters or 
armed conflict or indeed states transiting from authoritarian rule where consolidated state 
authority remains pivotal in consolidating a fragmented national polity.  
 
c) Arbitral Assaults on Governance 
 
The transplantation of a private framework of adjudication to issues of public policy has resulted 
in critical procedural anomalies which, paradoxically, sits in opposition to the standards of 
governance the very same arbitral tribunals seek to enforce in host states. First, the appointment 
and conduct of investment arbitrators challenges the core ‘principles of public accountability and 
judicial independence that underlie public law’.71 In particular, the ad-hoc nature of appointments 
– by disputing parties or designated external authorities72 on a case-by-case basis – mean that the 
‘[i]nstitutional safeguards of judicial independence’ that are normally present in the resolution of 
public law disputes, such as security of tenure, bars on external remuneration, and objective and 
independent assignment of cases to judges, are absent in investment arbitration.73 This, it has 
been argued, predisposes arbitrators to bias by increasing their financial and professional 
dependence on both foreign investors as the sole prospective claimants under the asymmetrical 
structure of investment arbitration and on officials in the designating arbitral centres.74  
 
These perceptions of bias are attenuated by criticisms that the ‘club’ of individuals from which 
arbitrators are selected form a closed circle of advocates ‘who serve as counsel in some cases and 
                                                 
68 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2008) 205 – 207. 
69 Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ in Stephan Schill (ed), 
International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 630.  
70 Montt (n 22) 126.  
71 Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and Transnational Governance’ (n 65) 615.  
72 IIAs often prescribe a designating authority for appointing arbitrators, such as the ICSID or the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of Arbitration (ICA) (see Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ (n 69) 4, fn 1).  
73 Gus Van Harten, ‘Contributions and Limitations of Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in 
International Investment Arbitration’ (2011) 1(4) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1, 3 – 4.  
74 ibid; Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness and the Rule of Law’ (n 69) 643-651; Gus 
Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008) 167-168.  
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as arbitrators in others, often obtaining repeated appointments, thereby raising concerns about 
potential conflicts of interest’.75 Additionally, there are concerns that although they are 
adjudicating on cases involving public interest, many arbitrators lack the professional expertise in 
public policy and are not accountable to stakeholders other than the parties to the dispute.76 This 
contrasts with the practice domestic legal regimes and in other public international arenas, such 
as the ICJ and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)’s dispute settlement body, where 
adjudicators tasked with review of government conduct are drawn from a wider pool of expertise 
and where the terms of appointments are reflective of the public character of the cases they hear.  
 
Concerns with the lack of transparency in the selection of arbitrators are matched by concerns 
over the lack of transparency in arbitral proceedings more generally. Here, the transposition of a 
system established for commercial disputes – with confidentiality as one of its ‘distinctive 
features’77 – sits uncomfortably with its new reality of hearing cases of public interest. A hallmark 
of this system has been its presumption of privacy that has greatly limited public access to 
arbitral proceedings, both in terms of documentary disclosure and third party participation in 
tribunal hearings. This adjudicative model premised on party autonomy, party consent and 
commercial confidentiality transplants uneasily to disputes involving matters of public concern 
which go beyond the interests of parties to the case.78 In recent years, there has been progress 
towards facilitating greater openness in arbitral proceedings but these new rules remain highly 
qualified and still fall short of the disclosure rules of many domestic legal regimes in cases that 
deal with public interest matters (see section 5). 
 
The informational and representation deficits of the arbitral system is further compounded by 
the lack of institutional hierarchy within the arbitral regime that has resulted in conflicting 
decisions on cases filed in multiple fora by foreign investors and by the absence of an effective 
and independent appellate mechanism that can redress these inconsistencies and other 
procedural deficits.79 Paradoxically, the problem of inconsistency in awards by different tribunals 
– illustrated by the Lauder and SGS arbitrations80 – and the absence of the doctrine of precedent 
in arbitral practice impact not only on the regulatory authority of host states but also on their 
ability to meet their obligations to foreign investors. If the purpose of IIAs is to serve as credible 
commitment devices to ensure regulatory certainty and manage regulatory risk, then the 
indeterminacy of the arbitral process risks undermining the capacity of states to formulate and 
implement coherent regulatory policy.  
 
                                                 
75 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies’ (Geneva, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2012) 88; see also Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and 
Transnational Governance’ (n 69) 615 – 616; Andrea Bjorklund, ‘The Emerging Civilization of Investment 
Arbitration’ (2009) 113(4) Penn State Law Review 1269, 1297 – 1298. 
76 ibid.  
77 Bjorklund (n 75) 1287.  
78 ibid; Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (n 23); Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 
1521, 1541 – 1542; UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2012’ (n 75); Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and 
Transnational Governance’ (n 69). 
79  See Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration’ (n 78) 1586. 
80 Ronald S. Lauder v Czech Republic (Final Award), UNCITRAL (3 September 2001); CME Czech Republic BV v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL (3 September 2001); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID 
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regarding ‘the same facts, related parties and similar investment rights’ while the latter two (SGS arbitrations) 
resulted in differing opinions regarding the similar investment rights and commercial situations for different sets of 
parties(Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Arbitration’ (n 78) 1558 – 1574.    
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The question of damages also reflects the hybrid nature of the investment regime which 
transposes a private adjudicatory regime to matters of international public interest. Inconsistent 
awards aside, the use of damages ‘as a public law remedy’ contrary to the practice of most 
international legal regimes81 highlights the fundamentally pecuniary nature of the investment 
arbitral system and contradicts arguments that such cases can work towards incentivising the 
improvement of domestic governance (see section 3). Without clear and prospective means of 
enforcing state obligations – such as trade sanctions available at the WTO – the investment 
regime relies on retrospective financial sanctions as a deterrent to supervise state compliance 
with their obligations at the same time as it seeks to use the same damages to compensate private 
actors for losses suffered as a consequence of host state treaty violations. However, the system 
lacks the public interest qualifications that apply to the award of damages in other international 
legal regimes, such as the European Court of Justice, that provide for damages to individual 
claimants, including thresholds of culpability and limits to the quantum of damages recoverable, 
despite the significant financial implications of such awards on host states, particularly 
developing country states.82 
 
5. Governance as Recalibration 
 
a) Rewriting Wrongs 
 
As the language of good governance becomes increasingly expressed in the law, policy and 
practice of the investment regime, there are increasing expectations that these narratives may be 
utilised to transform the deficiencies of the regime itself. In recent years, as global criticism of 
and dissatisfaction with the current investment law framework have intensified, the narratives of 
good governance and development have re-emerged as potential scripts for countering the 
legitimacy and credibility crisis in international investment law. As discussed in section 2, the 
discourse of good governance has been appropriated by proponents of the contemporary 
framework of international investment law to justify its prevailing norms and structures, 
particularly the constraints the system imposes on the political and economic institutions in host 
states. 
 
The concepts of good governance and the rule of law are now forming an important plank in 
efforts to recalibrate international investment law. On the one hand, notions of good governance 
and the rule of law provide the language through which claims of different stakeholders of the 
regime – host states, civil society groups and communities at the frontline of adverse foreign 
investment outcomes – can be articulated and through which the normative agenda of 
international investment may be challenged. At the same time, the discourse of good governance 
can also be viewed as supplying the scripts for countering the current legitimacy and credibility 
crisis in the investment regime through attempts to embed a broader social and public agenda 
into the system. In practice, both registers operate in tandem, reflecting the iterative process of 
sustained critique and incremental change. 
 
First, the good governance agenda has provided a conceptual and operational framework for 
forwarding critique of the procedural deficiencies of the investment arbitration regime. In 
particular, the discourse of the rule of law has supplied a valuable tool for highlighting the 
paradox of a system that purports to uphold standards of good governmental conduct (at least 
vis-a-vis investors) yet fails to engender such values within its institutional structure. Civil society 
                                                 
81 Van Harten and Loughlin (n 52) 131. 
82 ibid 131 - 133; Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 82 – 83.  
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groups, sometimes but not always, in conjunction with host states, have successfully lobbied for 
greater access to the arbitral process using the language of transparency, due process and good 
governance.83 Here, the rule of law has served as a valuable resource to leverage greater openness 
in the arbitral process, leading to incremental changes in public disclosure of and third party 
representation in arbitral proceedings. 
 
UNCTAD in its revised paper on ‘transparency’ observes the significant changes to the way in 
which transparency issues have been expressed in IIAs and arbitral practice since its last iteration 
of the note in 2004, noting in particular ‘the emergence of investor responsibilities’ and ‘the 
introduction of a transparency dimension into investor-state dispute settlement’.84 With respect 
to the latter, the organisation notes that the linking of sustainable development objectives with 
the language of good governance has led to changes in arbitral procedure that has enabled 
greater public participation in disputes that have implications for development strategies in host 
states, including increased public disclosure of documents, public access to hearings and third 
party representation via the submission of amicus briefs.85 
 
In this context, the parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had paved 
the way for greater public disclosure and access to arbitral proceedings, providing expressly that, 
subject to certain elementary redactions, nothing in the NAFTA precludes parties to the 
agreement ‘from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by a Chapter 
Eleven tribunal’.86 This reflects in part an extension of what Bjorklund identifies as the ‘strong 
cultures of open access to government information’ in North America, notably the US and 
Canada,87 but also demonstrates the strength and increasing professionalization of domestic 
advocacy, mainly by civil society groups, on these broader investment-related issues. The 
NAFTA practice has been extended in the new generation of model BITS issued by Canada and 
the US in 2003 and 2004 respectively, leading to a series of IIAs now containing extensive 
provisions on disclosure of documents and awards of arbitral tribunals, access to hearings and 
allowance of third party submissions in arbitration.88  
 
Meanwhile, amendments to the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules (ICSID Rules)89 and 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules (ICSID Additional Rules)90 in 2006 have enabled ‘access to the 
legal reasoning behind awards in cases administered by ICSID’ with express consent of the 
parties but ‘stop short of requiring the disclosure of the pleadings or the memorials submitted by 
the parties’.91 The recently adopted UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency (UNCITRAL 
                                                 
83 NGOs, such as the Canadian-based International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the 
Washington DC-based Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), have been active in monitoring IIAs 
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developing countries affected by foreign investment projects. 
84 UNCTAD, ‘Transparency’ (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, New York 
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85 ibid 36 – 37. 
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Transparency Rules)92 goes further than the ICSID amendments and provides for transparency 
throughout the entire lifecycle of a treaty-based investor-state arbitration conducted under 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, including the disclosure of a wide range of documents, such as 
party submissions and expert reports, subject to certain exceptions.93 Crucially, in a departure 
from other arbitral practice, the new rules require hearings to be open subject to limitations.94  
 
The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules also allow for third party involvement in investor-state 
disputes, continuing a trend towards broadening access to such hearings in other arbitral 
regimes. NAFTA parties set the precedent for amicus curiae submissions with the landmark 
receipt of such briefs by the tribunal in Methanex Corporation v US95 and later, in the case of UPS v 
Canada,96 a practice effectively codified in a latter statement by the Free Trade Commission in 
2003.97 Since then, a series of arbitral tribunals have accepted amicus submissions and allowed 
third party participation in investor-state disputes to varying degrees,98 highlighting in particular 
the public interest rationale in their reasoning for accepting these briefs.99 In addition to the 
expertise and alternative perspectives that amici may contribute to the substantive claims, 
tribunals have grounded their decision to allow amicus briefs in the wider legitimacy import of 
allowing such submissions. Specifically, tribunals have stressed the significance that acceptance 
of third party submissions would contribute towards enhancing the public image of the arbitral 
process.100  
 
Aside from challenging the procedural deficits of the arbitral system, critics of the investment 
regime have similarly harnessed the language of good governance to forward substantive 
arguments, usually in support of host states in defence of communities affected by investment 
projects and arbitral claims. Harrison, for example, notes the increasing frequency in which 
human rights arguments, framed in the context of substantive and procedural fairness and social 
justice, are raised by groups intervening in investment disputes.101 While the two concepts should 
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not be conflated, it is instructive to note Harrison’s assessment of why such discourses are 
attractive to those who seek to challenge the premise of international investment law. According 
to Harrison, a rights-framework posits an alternative claim on host states regulatory authority, 
creating primary legal obligations on states to intervene on behalf of its citizens where their 
rights – enshrined either via domestic constitutions or regional or international human rights law 
– are violated by third parties.102  
 
Similarly, the language of good governance supplies those stakeholders whose interests stand in 
opposition to the foreign investors’ proprietary rights protected by investment contracts and 
IIAs with a frame of reference under which their rights can be articulated and taken into 
account, both within and outside and the legal regime. Within the legal architecture of 
investment protection, the terminology afforded by the discourse of good governance, human 
rights and the rule of law ‘gives legal expression’ to certain values, such as social welfare and 
environmental protection, that would otherwise find little currency in the world of arbitration 
and international lawmaking.103 Operationalised through amicus submissions, these discourses 
‘translate ... public concerns’ into specialised terms of art that can be filtered and understood by 
arbitrators whose narrow field of expertise and limited parameters of engagement precludes 
them from otherwise hearing.104  
 
Outside the legal framework, the good governance agenda marshals public support for 
challenging the overarching universe of IIAs and investment policy by providing a language 
through which broader citizenry action against the constraints of the investment regime may be 
mobilised. In this manner, the good governance agenda may have mobilised greater recognition 
among policymakers of the need to shift the previously narrow focus of the investment regime. 
UNCTAD’s flagship report, the World Investment Report, in 2012 notes innovations in recently 
concluded IIAs have included features ‘to ensure that the treaty does not interfere with, but 
instead contributes to, countries’ sustainable development strategies’, including those that 
‘provide treatment and protection guarantees to investors without hindering the government’s 
power to regulate in the public interest’ or those that undermine domestic laws, including 
environmental and labour laws.105  Towards this end, UNCTAD itself has developed its 
‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’ which it is offering as a policy tool 
for governments developing national and international investment policies, including the 
reorientation of investment regimes towards more inclusive growth and sustainable 
development.106 
 
Importantly, the language of good governance has also been utilised to recalibrate the asymmetry 
between investment protection and investment regulation by placing emphasis on investor 
responsibilities in addition to investor rights. As noted previously, investor behaviour is 
increasingly being featured in newer generations of IIAs and state investment policy. Two 
prominent regional agreements in Africa – the Investment Agreement for the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Common Investment Area 2007 and the Protocol 
on Finance and Investment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 2006 – 
both contain provisions on ‘investor obligation’ and ‘corporate responsibility’ respectively, 
effecting placing obligations on foreign investors to comply with domestic laws, policies and 
administrative measures.107 The SADC’s model BIT further include measures to combat 
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corruption and sets standards for human rights, environment, labour and corporate governance 
while upholding the right of host states to regulate in the interest of development.108 
 
 b) Recalibration or Relegitimation   
 
The recalibration of investment law via the transformative language of good governance must be 
located within the limitations of the current framework of international law and crucially the 
geopolitical and economic realities of interstate relations and relations between host states and 
foreign investors. While concepts of good governance and the rule of law can serve ‘as a 
resource available to social movements to countervail the power of dominant social and 
economic forces’, it can also be used as a means of ‘inhibiting the possibilities for political 
action’.109 The utility of the good governance agenda as an instrument of public change must 
therefore be placed within the caveat. As previously discussed, changes in the framework of 
investment law and arbitration has been relatively incremental despite the extensive criticism 
directed at the regime and it is questionable whether the largely procedural reforms would have 
an impact on the substantive scope of international investment law. 
 
While there have been reforms towards greater transparency in and access to arbitral 
proceedings, discussed in the previous section, these innovations are not universal and remain 
subject to restrictions and exceptions. For example, under the amended ICSID Rules, disclosure 
of awards still requires parties’ consent and there is no requirement to make public other 
documents, such as submissions and pleadings.110 Similarly, the more comprehensive new 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules (see above) only comes into effect after 1 April 2014 and 
applies only to IIAs concluded after that date, allowing state parties to opt out or modify 
application of the rules.111 Disputes arising from treaties concluded before the Rules’ entry into 
force will be heard using the existing UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Moreover, since IIAs 
frequently provide for a menu of dispute settlement options, parties to an investment dispute 
could choose to have their disputes heard in other arbitral fora, such as the ICSID,  or 
organisations such as the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration or the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce that  have maintained the status quo on confidentiality. 
 
Correspondingly, provisions for third party participation in hearings remain limited largely to 
written submissions from the amici although tribunals can allow access to (but not participation 
in) the proceedings.112 Further, the right to participate is subject to tribunal approval and 
tribunals can and have rejected amicus curiae applications. While there has been a gradual 
acceptance of amicus curiae submissions by tribunals from interested third parties since the 
Methanex case, the extent to which the tribunals feel they are able and willing to give weight to 
the considerations raised by these submissions is questionable.113  
 
Additionally, formal access to tribunal proceedings does not necessarily translate into useful 
disclosure of information nor ensures effective participation by relevant stakeholders. The crux 
of the problem remains the diversion of disputes involving wider questions of public interest to 
an external regime that is inaccessible to local constituents and further disenfranchises 
participation in public processes of decision-making and adjudication. Access to information on 
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arbitral proceedings can be limited by virtue of the language, commonly English, used in the 
pleadings and decisions and unfamiliarity with the law applied in these cases.  
 
Moreover, while this recognition constitutes a step in the right direction, there are questions as to 
whether submissions brought by amici groups are sufficiently representative of the public interest 
in the disputes brought to tribunals. Given that access to such hearings requires a heavy 
investment of financial resources and expertise, amici curiae submissions may continue to 
constitute the preserve of well-organised, often metropolitan and externally funded organisations 
at the expense of local, grassroots organisations that may be at the sharp end of the ultimate 
outcome of arbitral decisions. 
 
At the same time, there are also significant concerns that the process of ‘recapturing the public 
sphere’ of arbitral proceedings114 may be utilised as a mechanism of relegitimising the authority 
of the arbitral process rather than a genuine attempt to reform the system. As Harrison and 
Tienhaara’s respective surveys of amicus submissions demonstrate, tribunals have typically 
justified their inclusion of such briefs as a means of strengthening the legitimacy of the arbitral 
process.115 
 
The tribunal in Suez/Interaguas v Argentina for example noted: 
 
The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desirable 
consequence of increasing the transparency of investor–state arbitration. Public 
acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, particularly when 
they involve states and matters of public interest, is strengthened by increased 
openness and increased knowledge as to how these processes function ... 
Through the participation of appropriate representatives of civil society in 
appropriate cases, the public will gain increased understanding of ICSID 
processes.116 
 
In other words, the good governance narrative is increasingly acting as a ‘prose of counter 
insurgency’117 to quell the incipient crisis of faith in the investment regime, similar to the manner 




This paper has sought to consider the relationship between investment law, development and 
good governance. Good governance is a construct that is rooted in temporal and policy space 
and its utilisation as a conceptual scaffold on which to evaluate the legitimacy and deficiencies 
within the international investment regime must be located within this broader construction of 
its emergence as this tool of international development policy. In the realm of investment law, 
the language of good governance and associated rule of law narrative have been the traditional 
leitmotif justifying the normative and institutional evolution of law and policy in this area. For the 
proponents of the contemporary legal universe of international investment, the framework of 
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IIAs and investment arbitration tribunals create a regime that provides an enabling climate for 
foreign investment, particularly in developing countries and transition economies.  
 
The narratives of good governance and the rule of law ‘legitimise a certain view of the legal 
system and its relation with the economy, and to naturalise a particular kind of economic 
structure’, the equation of law with progress and a market economy that prioritises investor 
rights as a sine qua non of economic development and a pre-requisite of social progress.118 In this 
sense, ‘BITs consciously seek to approximate in the developing, capital-importing state the 
minimal legal, administrative, and regulatory framework that fosters and sustains investment in 
industrialized capital-exporting states’.119 The refashioned ‘rule of international economic law’ 
offers a multilateral protection that the good governance agenda sought to deliver locally by 
providing a framework through which contemporary regulatory state can be disciplined. 
 
The aforementioned discussion has demonstrated that, both substantively and procedurally, at 
national and international levels, the current framework of investment law fails to meet the 
standards of good governance even as measured in their own terms. The good governance 
agenda must therefore be located within the conceptual premise of international investment law 
and mainstream development policy that problematises the role of state and upholds the primacy 
of market actors in delivering an enabling climate for social and economic development.  
 
This underlying conceptual legacy can and does limit the efficacy of the good governance 
discourse as a tool for recalibrating the imbalances of international investment law in favour of 
development and public interest outcomes. At its best, incorporating these concepts loads 
greater complexity onto a system that is currently ill-equipped with the expertise and institutional 
structure to support it while doing little to engender economic development and further the 
interests of social and ecological justice. At its most insidious, the discourse of good governance 
and its associated the aforementioned language of ‘counter insurgency’120 that seeks to mitigate 
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